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Department of Defense leaders plan to use outsourcing to reduce operations and
maintenance spending and enable them to increase procurement and research and
development spending. Even functions once labeled inherently governmental are now being
evaluated for outsourcing in the quest to reduce spending. One such function is the
Helicopter Combat Support (HC) Mission aboard Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships.
This thesis evaluates service contract cost escalation rates and compares them to in-
house cost escalation rates. Three Navy service contracts were evaluated, two aircraft
maintenance contracts and one aircraft simulator maintenance contract. The purpose was to
determine ifthe escalation rates differed enough to significantly affect DOD's ability to reduce
spending through outsourcing. This thesis also determines the total in-house cost to perform
the HC mission aboard MSC ships and evaluates commercial alternatives. The purpose is to
establish the contract cost at which outsourcing this mission will result in long term cost
reduction.
This thesis found that service contract costs escalate fester than in-house costs in certain
industries. This difference reduces or eliminates anticipated cost savings from outsourcing.
The total in-house performance cost of the HC MSC mission was determined for two
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Since the end of the Cold War, United States defense budgets have declined
significantly. This decline has forced the Department of Defense to become more creative
in its efforts to provide for national security with limited funds. DOD leaders believe
outsourcing and infrastructure reduction can reduce operating costs and ultimately provide
the dollars necessary to recapitalize and modernize in the future [Ref 1].
The constant pressure to do more with less, has caused DOD leadership to
consider outsourcing functions that traditionally have been considered inherently
Governmental as well as to re-evaluate its core competencies. One such function the
Department ofNavy is considering outsourcing is the Helicopter Combat Support Mission
on board the Military Sealift Command's (MSC), Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ships.
This requires leasing helicopter services from a commercial provider. The commercial
provider's personnel would deploy on MSC ships in place ofNavy helicopter
detachments.
B. OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This thesis has two objectives. The first objective is to answer the question: In
accordance with OMB Circular A-76, what is the total cost to the Government of the in-
house performance ofthe Helicopter Combat Support (HC) Mission aboard the MSC
CLF ships? The secondary research questions for this objective are:
(1 ) Can commercial providers adequately perform the required mission?
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(2) What additional factors should the Government consider when determining
the total contract cost?
The second objective is to answer the question: Are service contract cost
escalation rates substantially different than in-house cost escalation rates? The secondary
research questions for this objective are:
(2) What are the effects of any differences?
(3) What causes the differences?
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
1. Scope
This study is divided into two major parts. First, archival data from service
contracts were studied to determine service contract cost escalation rates. These rates
were then compared with appropriate in-house cost escalation rates based on indices
published by the Navy's Office of Budget. Service contract regulations and Government
practices were evaluated to determine their impact on contract cost escalation and explain
the differences between contract and in-house cost escalation rates.
Second, a valid supportable in-house cost analysis was completed in accordance
with OMB Circular A-76. In-house costs were divided into three categories, capital,
personnel and operating costs. After-action reports from two Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstrations were studied to determine the feasibility of using commercial
providers to fulfill the HC MSC mission. Finally the HC mission requirements were
evaluated to assess the comparability of commercial providers and in-house performance.
2. Limitations
Collecting usable archival data for the purpose of detenriiriirig contract cost
escalation rates was extremely difficult. A minimum of five consecutive years of
comparable data for each contract were needed to make the evaluation meaningful.
Aviation related contract data were sought so that they would be applicable to the HC
outsourcing issue. However, these data may have little significance for outsourcing of
non-aviation functions.
Aircraft operating costs were determined using Visibility and Management of
Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) data from the Navy Center for Cost Analyses.
VAMOSC data are currently the best data available for this purpose. However,
VAMOSC data do have their own limitations and the list ofthese limitations is provided in
Appendix B.
Since DON has not yet issued a Request for Proposal or an Invitation to Bid for
the HC mission, it will not be possible to compare the in-house cost to the bids or
proposals at this time.
D. METHODOLOGY
This thesis has two separate areas of research, and the methodology for each area
will be presented separately. First, the service contract cost escalation data collection
process will be discussed. The purpose of this process was to find archival data that could
be analyzed in order to determine cost escalation rates for outsourcing contracts and in-
house performance of similar functions. The necessary in-house performance data were
readily available. The contract databases maintained by the Federal Data Center do not
contain enough information to determine cost escalation rates. For this reason the service
contract data had to be collected by contacting program offices and requesting data. Only
aviation related program offices were contacted, on the assumption that aviation related
data are more relevant to the helicopter services being considered for outsourcing. Few
program offices actually provided usable data.
Second, the in-house cost analysis data collection process will be addressed. The
purpose of this process was to collect the data necessary to determine the total in-house
cost of the HC mission in question. Archival data was collected from the Center for Naval
Analyses, the Naval Center for Cost Analysis, the HC community, Commander Naval Air
Force Pacific staff, the Naval Safety Center and Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet staff.
The archival data were used to project the future total in-house cost.
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
This thesis is divided into six chapters, including this introduction. Chapter II
provides the background information necessary to understand the remaining chapters.
Chapter III presents and analyzes the service contract, Department ofLabor, and DOD
cost data. The chapter compares service contract cost escalation rates to in-house cost
escalation rates. Chapter IV develops the Government's total in-house cost to perform the
Helicopter Combat Support Mission aboard MSC ships. Chapter V provides criteria to
evaluate the possible commercial alternatives and examines the feasibility ofusing
commercial alternatives to fulfill the mission. Chapter VI summarizes the research and




This chapter provides an overview of the issues pertinent to this study. The
chapter is divided into two major areas, outsourcing within DOD and the Helicopter
Combat Support Community issues. No value judgements are made or intended. The
goal is merely to present the issues necessary to understand the remaining chapters.
B. OUTSOURCING ISSUES
1. Definitions
Outsourcing is the operation of a commercial activity for the
Government by a contractor. Essentially, it is characterized by the award
of a contract for a specific period oftime (typically one year) with two or
more renewal option periods. The Government retains ownership and
control over operations in the activity through surveillance of the
contractor. The primary method for outsourcing commercial activities is
through competition between the Government and private sector (i.e.,
under the A-76 program, comparing the cost of in-house to contract
performance to determine the most efficient and cost-effective mode of
operation). [ Ref 2]
Privatization differs from outsourcing in that the Government
divests itself of a commercial activity and purchases goods and/or services
from commercial sources. The Government may specify quality, quantity,
and timeliness requirements for purchased goods and services; however, it
has no control over the operations ofthe activity. The same activity may
also provide these goods and services to other customers. [Ref 3]
An inherently commercial product or service is any product or service that is
produced by private industry for customers other than governments.
2. Fundamentals
The primary purpose of outsourcing is to allow an organization to concentrate on
its core competencies, while taking advantage of another organization's core
competencies, ultimately leading to reduced cost at the same or better quality. In
manufacturing, outsourcing is often referred to as a "make-or-buy" decision. For
example, an automobile manufacturer may find it more cost effective to buy windshields
from a glass company than to make them. The glass company sells the windshields at a
profit, of course, but it is so efficient at making windshields it can sell them cheaper than
the auto manufacturer can make them. When one applies this same logic to services, it is
called outsourcing instead of "make-or-buy". Large organizations, public or private,
often require many different types of services in order to support their core competencies.
Although these services may be absolutely vital to their missions, they may not necessarily
be good at them. It is easy to believe that an auto manufacturer may not be the best
windshield manufacturer, but it can't sell cars without windshields. Government has the
same problems. The Federal Government is so large that it is impossible to list all ofthe
services required to keep it running. It is fair to say that Government agencies are not
always the most efficient and/or effective organizations.
3. Department of Defense Perspective
Outsourcing has recently become an everyday word within the Department of
Defense. DOD has placed new emphasis on outsourcing because decreasing budgets
have forced it to find more cost effective ways to provide for National Security. DOD
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budget officials have stated that they expect a $3 billion per year savings as a result of
outsourcing by the year 2003. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states the
following: [DOD] "demonstrates that it can enjoy many of the benefits that private
industry has gained from outsourcing - tighter focus on core tasks; better service quality;
more responsiveness and agility; better access to new technologies; and lower costs.'*[Ref
4] Outsourcing is a two way street, however, and the QDR omits the disadvantages
associated with outsourcing. According to studies by RAND Corporation [Ref 5] and the
General Accounting Office [Ref 6], outsourcing does have some drawbacks. Some
disadvantages to be considered are the inflexibility of Government contractual agreements,
loss of real time control by the Chain ofCommand, and an inability to deal with surge
capacity requirements [Ref 7].
Consider some ofthe advantages and disadvantages of outsourcing in more detail.
Outsourcing provides a tighter focus on core tasks; this is the primary reason for
outsourcing in industry and in Government. Proponents believe that, by avoiding the
functions that distract or impede the organization from its core competencies, it can
achieve better overall quality and lower cost. However, once a function is outsourced,
some amount of control over quality and flexibility of service is lost. In theory the service
provider should be more adept and skilled at performing the service and, therefore, quality
should improve. In general the ability to focus on core tasks should improve overall
quality. An outside provider may offer more responsiveness and agility. This is true when
dealing with a competitive industry that is large enough to absorb changes in volume. It
should be easier to add to or subtract from a service contract than to hire employees and
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rebuild infrastructure.
On the other hand, if a job is being performed by military members and the Chain
ofCommand wishes to change the schedule or a requirement, the order is given and the
change occurs. This is not so simple with contracts. The Command must go through the
contracting office, which may be located locally or in a different time zone. The Federal
Government deals with contractors in a fundamentally different way than private industry.
Private companies often form partner-like relationships in which they depend on each
other, each understanding that it is in their own interest that their partner makes a profit.
They help each other compete against the other companies in their respective industries.
The Government and its contractors are required to comply with many regulations which
make these partner-like relationships difficult, ifnot impossible. Although outsourcing can
provide improved service at a lower cost, it is not always a win-win situation, and each
case must be evaluated carefully. One of the first things that must be done is a complete
cost comparison. This is often very time consuming and difficult because the Government
does not really know how much activities actually cost.
4. Regulations and Policies
a. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Circular A-76
OMB Circular A-76 establishes the Federal policy regarding the
performance ofcommercial activities. A commercial activity is one which is operated by
a Federal executive agency and which provides a product or service which could be
obtained from a commercial source. A commercial activity is not an inherently
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Governmental function. An inherently Governmental function is a function which is so
intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance by Government
employees. A-76 states,
In the process of governing, the Government should not compete
with its citizens. The competitive enterprise system, characterized by
individual freedom and initiative, is the primary source of national
economic strength. In recognition of this principle, it has been and
continues to be the general policy ofthe Government to rely on commercial
sources to supply the products and services the Government needs. [Ref 8]
A-76 requires that, " the Government shall not start or carry on any activity to
provide a commercial product or service if the product or service can be procured more
economically from a commercial source."[Ref 9] Exhibit 1 in OMB Circular A-76 lists all
ofthe conditions permitting government performance of commercial activities and the
conditions permitting contract performance of commercial activities. In Exhibit 1 one of
the performance conditions is lower cost. This condition calls for a cost comparison to
determine the lower cost alternative. The majority ofOMB Circular A-76 provides
instructions for the conduct ofthe cost comparisons. In general, the cost comparison
process consists of six major components. They are 1) the development of a Performance
Work Statement (PWS) and Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP); 2) the
performance of a management study to determine the government's Most Efficient
Organization (MEO); 3) the development of an in-house Government cost estimate; 4)
issuance ofthe Request for Proposal (RFP) or Invitation for Bid (IFB); 5) the comparison
of in-house cost against a proposed contract or Inter Service Support Agreement (ISSA)
price, and 6) the Administrative Appeal Process, which is designed to assure all the costs
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entered on the Cost Comparison Form (CCF) are fair, accurate and calculated in
accordance with Part II ofOMB Circular A-76 [Ref 10]. The PWS ensures all bids and
proposals are for the same work requirements, so they may be judged equitably. The
guidance provided in A-76 is to be used by Federal agencies to ensure that cost
comparisons are fair and reasonable. OMB Circular A-76 provides very detailed
instructions for the conduct of cost comparisons. It levels the playing field between public
and private competitors. A-76 requires that the in-house cost analysis include expenses
for cost of capital, insurance, and depreciation, just as if the Federal agency were a private
contractor. Ifdone correctly, the in-house cost analysis will include all Government
expenses and, therefore, allow private industry a fair opportunity to win the competition.
b. Service Contract Act of 1965
The Service Contract Act of 1965 (SCA) applies to "all contracts in
excess of $2500, or an indefinite amount, the principal purpose ofwhich is to furnish
services through the use of service employees."[Ref 1 1] Most but not all outsourced
contracts are subject to SCA. SCA requires all contractors and subcontractors to pay all
of their employees involved in the performance ofthe contract the prevailing industry-
regional wages and fringe benefits. The Department ofLabor (DOL) determines these
prevailing wages by conducting industry surveys. The prevailing wage determinations are
segregated by Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) and geographic region.
Furthermore, ifthe preceding contract provided substantially the same services in the same
locality and the wages and fringe benefits were provided for under a collective bargaining
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agreement, then the new contractor must provide the same or greater wages and fringe
benefits. This also applies to any and all subcontractors as well. There is an "out" from
this clause. Ifthe contractor petitions DOL for a hearing and DOL determines that the
wages and fringe benefits provided under the previous collective bargaining agreement are
substantially at variance with the compensation for the SIC and locality, then the wages
revert to the DOL determination. Finally, the Government agency issuing the contract is
required to insure contractor compliance with the Service Contract Act of 1965. Ifthe
agency accepts a bid and begins work under a contract agreement and the agreed upon
compensation is not in compliance with SCA, then DOL will require the contractor to
retroactively comply with SCA and the Federal agency to pay additional costs to the
contractor based on the new compensation rates.
c. Small Business Act
The Small Business Act requires Government agencies to award some
contracts to small and socially or economically disadvantaged businesses, even though
they are not the low bidder. This act doesn't affect as many outsourcing contracts as
SCA, but it does affect some. Twenty percent of the total dollar value of all contracts
each fiscal year should be awarded to small businesses and five percent of the total should
be awarded to disadvantaged businesses. The small and/or disadvantaged businesses must
submit a bid that qualifies as "fair market value". However, this means they can bid as
high as ten percent over the lowest bid and still be awarded the contract.[Ref 1 2]
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d. Walsh-Healey Act
The Walsh-Healey Act applies to Government contracts in excess of
$10,000, for which the primary purpose is the purchase ofmanufactured or
remanufactured goods. Like the Service Contract Act, this act requires contractors to pay
their employees the prevailing industry wages and benefits as determined by the
Department of Labor. The Walsh-Healey Act differs form the Service Contract Act in
three very important ways: 1 ) the Walsh-Healey Act has no collective bargaining
agreement clause; 2) the Walsh-Healey Act does not apply to purchases of such materials
as may usually be bought in the open market; and 3) all liability for compliance with the
act is born by the contractor. [Ref 13]
C. HELICOPTER COMBAT SUPPORT COMMUNITY ISSUES
1. Mission and Composition Overview
This section provides some background information on the Helicopter Combat
Support Community (HC) and the specific outsourcing issue being considered. The HC
community is the oldest helicopter community in the Navy. The Navy has long recognized
the virtues of helicopters for logistics and combat support purposes. Today's Helicopter
Combat Support Community performs many diverse missions. The primary missions of
the HC community include day/night Vertical Replenishment (VERTREP), Vertical
Onboard Delivery (VOD), day/night amphibious Search and Rescue (SAR), and air head
operations. Secondary missions include Special Warfare Support (SWS); recovery of
torpedoes, drones, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Unmanned Undersea Vehicles
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(UUVs); Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO); aeromedical evacuations
(MEDEVAC); humanitarian assistance; and disaster relief. The community consists of six
operational squadrons and one fleet replacement squadron (FRS) [Ref 14]. The FRS and
four of the six operational squadrons operate the CH-46 Seaknight helicopter. The four
operational CH-46 squadrons deploy on board ships in small detachments consisting of
two helicopters, the necessary crew and maintenance personnel. These detachments
deploy on L-class amphibious assault ships and various multi-product logistic ships. From
the logistic ships, the helicopters are used for VERTREP, Search and Rescue, and the
transfer ofpassengers, mail and important cargoes to and from various ships in the battle
group. These detachments spend a large portion of their mission flight hours performing
the VERTREP mission. The VERTREP mission is essential to underway replenishment.
Although all Navy combatants and supply ships are capable of connected replenishment
(CONREP), CONREP alone is not fast enough to meet the needs ofthe Navy [ Ref 1 5].
The Navy's current inventory ofCH-46 helicopters is very old and in need of
modernization. The airframes are approaching their specified flight hour limits. The Navy
plans to replace the CH-46's with CH-60's. The Navy is considering outsourcing the HC
mission aboard some Military Sealift Command ships. That would require the purchase of
fewer CH-60 helicopters.
The Military Sealift Command operates 27 of the Navy's Combat Logistics Force
(CLF) ships, 14 oilers (TAO), 5 ammunition ships (TAE) (one more TAE is expected),
and 8 combat stores ships (TAPS) [Ref 1 6]. Manned and operated by civilians, these
ships deploy with a CH-46 helicopter detachment embarked. The HC mission aboard the
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13 ammunition and combat stores ships is being recommended for outsourcing.
2. Logistics Requirements
The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) conducted a study [Ref 17] to determine
how many Naval logistics helicopters are necessary to support the National Security
Strategy of conducting two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. CNA's concept
for the study was that, to sustain the fighting units, the average logistics resupply should
occur at the same rate as consumption. This study addressed the requirements of the
amount of cargo needed to be moved and the maximum time each combatant could spend
receiving stores, as opposed to engaging in combat. The aircraft carriers and the large
deck amphibious assault ships require the most cargo and are afforded the least amount of
time to receive stores— 12 hours for the carrier and 18 hours for the amphibious assault
ship. By evaluating lifts per hour per helicopter, CNA determined the minimum number of
helicopters required. This minimum number changed as a function of lift capacity of the
specific helicopter type. CNA determined two helicopters per support ship are required
when the helicopter lift capacity is 2.0 to 2.5 tons. It also determined that the requirement
could be decreased to only one helicopter on the TAPS ifthe helicopter had a 3.5 ton lift
capacity. The AOE and TAE still required two helicopters. The HC community leaders
accepted the CNA study results. The current procurement plans for the CH-60 are based
on the requirements in the study and the option of outsourcing the mission aboard the
TAE's and TAFS's, which is currently performed in-house using CH-46's. The following
chart summarizes the lift capabilities ofthe different type helicopters evaluated by CNA as
16
























3. CH-60 Procurement Plan
The current Helo Master Plan requires 194 CH-60s to replace the CH-46s, H-3s,
HH-60s, and H-53s necessary to meet the needs of the CLF in accordance with the
National Security Strategy [Ref 19]. This requirement includes 24 aircraft, or
approximately 14% ofthe operational aircraft, for the Fleet Replacement Squadron. Ifthe
Navy decides not to outsource the MSC HC mission, then it will need an additional 23 or
32 CH-60's, depending on whether the TAFS detachments are reduced to one helicopter.
This decision has not yet been finalized. The breakdown for helicopters required if the
mission remains in-house is as follows:
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MSC Support CH-60 Requirement
6TAEs 8TAFSs FRS Total
One Aircraft per TAFS 12 08 03 23
Two Aircraft per TAFS 12 16 04 32
The CH-60 is still in the early stages ofthe procurement process; the Operational
Requirements Document has not yet been signed. The CH-60 is being procured in
conjunction with the Army's UH-60 as a variant ofthe UH-60. The first CH-60's are
expected to arrive in the fleet in fiscal year 1999.
4. CH-60 Capabilities and Features
The list ofCH-60 expected capabilities is provided below. This list was derived
from conversations with and information from the Program Manager. [Ref 20]
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CH-60 Capabilities and Features
**** Compatible with all CLF ships. No required hangar or flight deck
modifications because the CH-60 is equipped with Blade fold and Tail fold
systems
* * * * Proven to be transportable by C-130, C-5
**** 9000 lbs Cargo Hook/Handling system
**** 15 seat cabin for 13 passengers and 2 crewmen or 3000 lbs cargo and 2
crewmen
* * * * MEDEVAC capable
**** Day/Night VFR/IFR over water navigation system
**** Night over water hover system and rescue hoist; the CH-60 is day and
night SAR capable
**** Endurance of 2 hours with internal tanks and greater than 6 hours with
external tanks
**** Minimal initial impact on Navy's logistics support system followed by a
large reduction in logistics expense once all H-60 Navy achieved
**** The CH-60 is compatible with the Hellfire Missile. With minor
modifications it is also compatible with the following weapon systems: the
30mm gun pod - the 20mm gun pod - 2.75" rockets - stinger missiles.
19
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III. SERVICE CONTRACT COST DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
The goal of this analysis is to compare contract cost escalation to in-house cost
escalation and analyze the effects ofany differences. The analysis will include examination
of archival data provided by different program contracting offices, by DOD records and by
the Bureau ofLabor Statistics. The analysis will also include input derived from
conversations with the many contracting officials contacted during the data collection
phase, as well as the personal experiences ofthe researcher. This chapter is divided into
four remaining sections.
The hypothesis section describes the hypothesis which this data was collected to
test and the general thought process behind the hypothesis.
The Policy Problems and Concerns section provides a critical analysis of current
policies which the researcher believes negatively affect the economic benefits of
outsourcing.
The Data Presentation and Analysis sections are self explanatory. This is an
analysis of outsourcing not privatization. The DOD definitions of these two terms are
provided in the Background Chapter.
B. HYPOTHESIS
Hypothesis: Service contract costs escalate faster than in-house costs for similar
functions.
The Center for Naval Analyses conducted a study of outsourcing based on A-76
competition data received from the Office of Privatization. The study, "An Examination
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of the DOD Commercial Activities (CA) Competition Data," looks at the public versus
private competition process [Ref 21]. The study is based on only the competition data.
This was confirmed by speaking with Derek Trunkey, one of the authors.
The CNA study shows that the A-76 competition process results in the prediction
of savings to the government. These predictions of savings occur no matter who wins the
competition, the Government's Most Efficient Organization or the private sector. The
bids are on average 31% less than the original baseline costs. Therefore, CNA concluded
that it is to the Navy's benefit to compete every possible function for outsourcing and that
the Navy could save in excess oftwo billion dollars annually. The CNA conclusions may
be a little premature. No follow-up was done to see if the predicted savings ever
materialized or, ifthey did materialize, ifthey were sustained and for how long. In other
words, what happens throughout the life of the project? It should be noted that in A-76
competitions won by the Government, a follow-up study is required to ensure the
Government has reduced its manning down to the Most Efficient Organization. This
chapter will take the next step and answer the question: what happens to the contract price
in the follow-on years? There are three possibilities. 1 ) The contract costs increase at a
faster rate than in-house costs; then long term savings are negated. 2) The contract costs
increase at slower rate; then long term savings are magnified. 3) Contract costs increase
at the same rate as in-house costs. Figure 3-1 presents two graphs which illustrate the
first two of these three possibilities.
In Figure 3-1 the assumed initial savings is 25%. This 25% initial savings is based
on the average difference between contractor bids and Government MEO bids when the
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contractor wins the competition. This average difference was determined by evaluating
the Navy competitions in which a contract was awarded. The total of the contractor bids
was 25% less than the total in-house cost. Notice that the initial 25% savings in Figure 3-
lb is relatively small when compared to the loss or savings after 20 years of differential
inflation.
It appears that studies in this area seem to be focussed on determining the
theoretical initial annual savings. The CNA study converted the theoretical first year
savings into 1 996 constant dollars and estimated huge annual savings. It assumed that all
costs, contract and in-house, increased at the same average annual rate over the life of the
study. This assumption is not valid.
4*



















There is evidence that contract costs and in-house costs inflate at substantially
different rates and that, by ignoring this evidence, the Government is making outsourcing
decisions which often do not save money and may ultimately cost the Government far
more.
C. POLICY PROBLEMS AND CONCERNS
Unfortunately, not all government outsourcing practices and policies are conducive
to saving money. This section addresses some ofthe current practices and policies which
impede the economic benefits of outsourcing. Information about these policies is derived
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from reading relevant Government instructions and conversations with contracting
administrators ofthe different program offices which were contacted for the purpose of
data collection.
1. Follow-up
Follow-up studies are not required. Once a function is outsourced, the
government rarely looks back to ensure the anticipated savings were ever achieved. No
requirements are in place to ensure the necessary data for such follow-up studies are even
maintained, let alone in any type of user friendly format. Program contracting offices are
required to maintain contracts and data only until the contract is closed out (after the final
option year). Once closed out, contracts are forwarded to the Federal archives. The
Federal Data Center does maintain data on all contracts over $25,000.00 for 15 years; the
data is provided to the Federal Data Center via Form DD350. Form DD350 does not
contain information on contract volume or unit price, nor does it have a field linking it to
the previous or follow-on contracts. The data from the Federal Data Center is not useful
for the purpose of determining contract inflation. Furthermore, when researching service
contract inflation rates, not one contracting officer or program office was able to provide
any historical inflation information. (Some contracting offices did maintain contract data
but they did not take the time to measure the annual cost increases.) Many contracting
officers said that the new contracts changed so dramatically that it is not possible to
compare them with the old contracts. These changes generally involved changing the
units on which contract costs were based. For example, a contract for simulator
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maintenance originally paid for services based on number of training hours (the hours the
simulator was used for training). The contract was changed so the costs were based on
the number of hours the simulator was available for use. This change allowed the
Government to include a performance clause based on the simulator availability rate.
According to the contracting officials, the new contract provided a better value to the
government [Ref 22]. In other cases similar work from different geographic locations
were combined or separated. When the contracting officials stated that the contract data
were unsuitable for the purpose of this thesis, they were unwilling to provide the data.
Some simulator data were provided that were incomparable because the units on which
the contract costs were based changed, as mentioned above. Since the actual number of
training hours covered under the new contract were not available, a comparison is not
appropriate.
2. Limited Competition
OMB Circular A-76 has no requirement for a minimum number of bidders before
an agency can outsource. It is impossible to have competition without competitors.
Competition is the economic foundation on which the ability to control costs is built.
Without an adequate number of willing suppliers to fill the government's service needs, it
is impossible to control costs. The recent trend ofmergers in the Defense industry
contributes to the problem by decreasing the number of competitors. The lack of
competition, coupled with the current regulatory environment and lack of follow-up
studies, provides incentive for contractors to "buy in", or underbid the first year so they
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can get the government to outsource. Once the government does away with the
infrastructure and personnel, switching back is expensive. Furthermore, public versus
private competitions are only required when the Government is performing a commercial
activity; they are not required ifthe commercial activity is contracted out.
3. Social Policy
The Small Business Act requires the Government to give special consideration to
small businesses and socially or economically disadvantaged businesses. A small business
can be as much as 10% more expensive than the low cost bid of a large business, and yet
the contract must still be awarded to the small business, all other things being equal. The
same applies for women and minority owned businesses. It is difficult to control contract
inflation rates when the contracting officer is not authorized to choose the low cost
provider. Now, even with a large number of bidders, the government may still overpay by
as much as 10% above the most economical rate in any given year.
4. Service Contract Act of 1965
Outsourcing contracts are primarily service contracts, and any service contract
over 2500 dollars is subject to the Service Contract Act of 1965 [Ref 23]. The
requirements ofthe Act are summarized on page 12. Many of the people interviewed
discussed how the Department of Labor Wage Determinations forced them to pay their
contractors additional money. Furthermore, the contracting official for the TH-57
helicopter, mentioned that collective bargaining agreements aggravated the problem. He
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observed that, once the contract was signed and work started, the contractor had no
incentive to hold out against the union's demands, because the Government will pay the
contractor for extra labor costs. Furthermore, when his competitors bid against him
during the next competition, the competitors are required to base their bid on the same
labor rates set forth under his collective bargaining agreement. Other companies are not




Government contracts are very dynamic in nature, making it difficult to compare
contracts from different years. It was difficult to find contracts that were stable long
enough to compare with follow-on contracts. Three contracts with at least five
consecutive years of usable data were found, two aircraft maintenance contracts and one
aircraft simulator maintenance contract. In all three cases, contracts were compared to
their option years. An option year is an option for the government and the company to
extend their contract for an additional year. The basic contract remains the same. Some
economic and volume adjustments are made and the contract is renewed. The contract is
not submitted for competitive bidding if an option year is exercised. In the case of the
TH-57 Maintenance Contract, the data are from three successive contracts and their
option years. However, the prime contractor did not change. The graph and table
presented in Figure 3-2 show the average annual cost increase of each ofthree contracts
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over the period from which data were available compared to the average annual public
sector cost increases over the same time period. The data clearly demonstrates that these
contracts had a significantly larger average annual cost increase than did similar in-house
functions. In this case the in-house cost increases were derived from aircraft maintenance
cost indices. Aircraft maintenance costs are funded from three different appropriations.
They are Military Personnel Navy, Operations and Maintenance Navy and, Aircraft
Procurement Navy. Escalation tables published by the Department ofNavy Office of
Budget contain the escalation factors for all of the Navy appropriations. Each of the three
factors was weighted based on its contribution to total aircraft maintenance costs. All the
data collected are from contracts in aviation related areas, two aircraft maintenance
contracts and one aircraft simulator maintenance contract.
Average Annual Inflation Rates; Public vs Contractor
Contract year Public Contractor
TH-57 Maintenance 1986 to 1996 2.97% 6.19%
Simulator Maintenance 1992 to 1997 2.27% 5.48%
C-1 2 Maintenance 1992 to 1996 2.40% 4.52%
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2. TH-57 Maintenance Contract
The TH-57 is the Navy's designation for the Bell Jet Ranger, a very popular
commercial helicopter. The only data provided for the TH-57 maintenance contract were
total annual cost and annual flight hours supported by the contract. After converting the
data to cost per flight hour, the average annual cost increase was determined. The
contracting office was in the process of relocating; so, any additional data were
unavailable. The contract manager indicated that their were no significant changes in
service requirements and that the composite labor rate paid to the contractor had more
than doubled since 1982. UNC Aviation Services/Burnside-Ott, the prime contractor,
does have a labor union and the labor rates are negotiated under a collective bargaining
agreement. It has had the contract since 1983. It changed names to UNC Aviation
Services in 1991 and won the contract for the fourth time in 1995. The data are provided
in Figure 3-3. The different colors represent different contracts and their corresponding
option years.
TH-57 Contact Data
Year Contract Cost Flight hours Cost per Flight hour
86 $ 17,150,028 92994.2 $ 184.42
87 $ 18,450,968 95620.4 $ 192.96
88 $ 20,515,357 90873.3 $ 225.76
89 $ 19,026,068 95569.6 $ 199.08
90 $ 19,040,183 85949.9 $ 221.53
91 $ 18,700,374 79002.2 $ 236.71
92 $ 19,260,139 77677.9 $ 247.95
93 $ 21,976,000 77643.7 $ 283.04
94 $ 21,874,000 75360.1 $ 290.26
95 $ 20,636,654 61906.4 $ 333.35
96 $ 20,202,444 60057.7 $ 336.38




Figure 3-4 shows the effect that the differential inflation would have on this
contract ifthe average annual rates were to remain the same for twenty years. The data
only cover ten years. Year zero starts with an assumed 25% savings, that is, the contract
cost starts 25% below the Government MEO cost. This assumption is based on the
average difference between contract bids and total in-house costs. Figure 3-4 is presented
to demonstrate the effect of an inflation differential of this magnitude; the starting point
for the contract cost is the 1986 contract cost. The initial in-house cost is the contract
cost divided by .75. Note that the lines intersect before the ten year point. This cost
increase differential actually occurred from 1986 to 1996. Therefore, if this contract
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3. Simulator Maintenance Contract
The simulator maintenance contract data provided cover one relatively small
simulator maintenance contract from 1992 through 1997. This contract has many
different line items (more than 30), and line items were added and subtracted throughout
the option years. However, the manner in which the option year contract prices were
modified allows for an interesting and relevant comparison. The option years of the
contract were adjusted for Department ofLabor wage determinations after the fact,
instead ofbeforehand. On the delivery orders, which were made from the funding
documents, the DOL wage adjustment was added to basic cost at the end ofeach fiscal
year. For example, in FY 1995 the contractor price was increased $250,462.00 over the
basic rate, which was based on FY 1993 labor rates. The $250,462.00 was not a single
year increase; it was a two year increase. In FY 1 996 the increase appears to be just as
large as the 1995 increase. However it covers three years, 1994, 1995, and 1996; so, the
average annual increase was much smaller. The rate of increase for each case was
calculated by adding the DOL increase to the base year cost and then using the two point
method for converting it to an average annual increase dependent on the elapsed time
since the base year for the labor rates. The formula used is:
Average Annual Increase = ((Base cost + DOL adjustment)/(base cost)) (1 n) - 1
Where 'n' is the number of years elapsed.
The overall weighted average was calculated by first averaging the increases for
each year. For example 1994 has four rates that were averaged. Once all of the yearly
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averages were calculated, an average ofthe averages was calculated. Although, the basic
cost is calculated using a base year labor rate, the basic cost also includes procurement
cost of repair parts. The rates of increase represent the increase in labor as a percent of
the total cost. The contract manager said she estimates the increase at 5% each year for
planning purposes. That agrees with the findings here. Figure 3-5 presents the contract
data used for the calculations. The total increase shown in Figure 3-5 is the ending cost
minus the beginning cost divided by the beginning cost. It is the total change in contract
price as a percent ofthe base cost.
Simulator Maintenance Contract Data Effects of DOL Wage Determinations
AverageYear 93 94 95 96 97
92 $ 1,937,161
93 $2,086,837 $2,089,716 $1,606,948 $ 1,807,729 $ 1,208,192 7.73%
94 $ 2,169,827 5.08%
95 $1,857,410 5.50%
96 $ 2,058,191 4.50%
97 $ 1,418,230 4.57%
DOL Increase $ 149,676 $ 80,111 $ 250,462 $ 250,462 $ 210,038
Weighted
5.48%
Average Annual Escalation Rate
Contract 7.73% 3.83% 7.51% 4.42% 4.57%
Public 2.92% 2.26% 2.22% 2.23% 2.11%
Toteil increase = (ending value - beginning value)/(beginning value)
Contractor 7.73% 3.83% 15.59% 13.86% 17.38%
Public 2.92% 2.26% 4.49% 6.83% 8.70%
Figure 3-5
Figure 3-6 represents what would happen if this inflation differential continued
over a period oftwenty years. Again it is based on 25% savings in year zero. The graph
is for illustration purposes. The starting dollar value for the contractor is the 1992
contract cost from Figure 3-5.
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4. C-12 Maintenance Contract
The C-12 maintenance contract data used for this study are ideal for this purpose.
Unfortunately it is only five years worth of data. Volume and cost data were provided for
twelve line items. The volume for each line item remained constant from 1992 until 1996.
The constant volume allows for an equitable unit cost comparison. In cases where volume
changes significantly, fixed costs can cause unit costs to change abruptly. Eleven out of
the twelve line items were usable for comparison. The "materials for logistics and
maintenance support" line item was not used because materials that were purchased in the
first two years ofthe contract were used in the later option years. The other eleven line
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items all showed cost inflation rates greater than the in-house cost inflation rate from 1 992
through 1996. The weighted average was computed by summing the unit cost times the
expected annual volume and then calculating the average annual increase for the annual
totals. Figure 3-7 shows each line item, its average annual increase, and the difference
between the line item rate and the in-house rate. The line item total annual cost
is provided to show how each line item contributed to the weighted average.
Figure 3-8 is provided for illustration purposes, C-12 maintenance has always been
contracted out and no A-76 study was done. The starting contract cost is the actual
contract from 1992. For many years prior to 1992 the contracts were sole source, with no
competitive bids. Notice how much longer it takes to overcome the 25% initial savings.
C-12 Lme Item Cost Escalation
Year LineQ2 | Line05
I
LineOS Line 07a | Une 07b UneOB i Line09 I LinelO | Line 11 bne12 Line 13 Annual
Then Year Lhrt Cost Times Constant Annual Line Item \Ad1utb Total
92 $11,356,824 $446,640 ' $1,043,964 ! $211,455 $60,060 | $7,195,800 $249,840 i $258,900 $58.030 . $360,350 I $52,960 $21294.893
93 $12,094,306 $485,040 $1,067,110
:
$222345 $63,180 $8,165,700 $260,040 $269,520 $60.340 ! $377,050 $53,060 $23,142713
94 $12,649,992 $497,720 $1,175,634: $233,415 $66,340 $8,063,300 $273,360 $283,380 I $63,060
j $393,950 $60,000 $23,760,151
95 $13210,692 $522200
! $1,230,552 $244,035 $69,510 1 $8,777250 $286,920 . $297,480 ' $65,900 ! $412950 $63,320 $25,180,809
96 $13,937,196 $551,840
!
$1,296,540 i $254,880 $72,830
! $8,119,300 ; $302,400 i $313,560 , $69,340 : $433250 $67,560 $25,418,695
AverageAnnual Escalation
Avgam 5.25% 5.43% i 5.57%
I
4.78% 4.93% 3.06% 4.89% 4.91% | 4.54% 4.71% 627% 4.52%
OffDCD 285% 3.03%
I
3.17% I 238% 253% 0.67% 249% 251% I 214% 231% 387% 213%
Figure 3-7
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Any proper analysis of data must include some explanation concerning the
applicability ofthe data. In this thesis all of the data are aviation related. While this may
preclude direct comparison to the many other areas in which DOD oustources, the basic
concepts are applicable to those other areas.
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2. Contractors use Labor More Efficiently
Savings from outsourcing occur because the contractor makes more efficient
use of his personnel. As stated earlier, outsourcing is merely contracting for services
from outside suppliers instead of paying employees within the organization to provide the
service. Government employees and military members are not on the top end of the pay
scale; yet, outsourcing is able to achieve savings even though the contractor employees
may be getting paid more. It is important to understand how this can be possible. To
illustrate, we can use a generic example of aircraft organizational maintenance and apply
some observations and personal experience from the C-12. When it comes to aircraft
maintenance, DOD has very specific requirements to ensure the safety of the aircrew,
passengers, and government property. These requirements apply also to contractors. The
contractor must conform to all ofthe same periodic inspection, phase replacement, and
quality assurance requirements as the military. The contractor is using the same
replacement parts at the same price to the government. If the contractor's employees get
paid more than DOD's employees, how can the contractor underbid the in-house cost?
The answer is that the contractor uses fewer people to get the job done. The Military may
have two or three shifts to ensure that maintenance people are available when necessary.
The contractor can use flexible hours and have the workers come in only when there is
work to be done. In the case of the C-12 at NAS Oceana, the contractor maintained the
aircraft with only two employees. When the aircraft was scheduled to fly, one ofthem
came in and performed the pre-fiight preparations. After the C-12 departed, he went
home. When the aircraft returned from flight, one of the maintainers was waiting to
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perform the post flight maintenance and get the aircraft ready for the next event. Ifthe
aircraft was not broken, he went home. On occasion both maintainers had to work extra
to get the aircraft fixed, but those occasions were few and far between. Rarely did they
exceed a forty hour work week, because, unlike the military, if there was no work to do
they went home. Additionally, both of the maintainers were qualified in all aircraft
systems.
In DOD, personnel specialize in one, or maybe two areas. Military personnel also
change jobs every few years, making it more difficult to be an expert on one type of
aircraft. Thus, the contractor uses his personnel much more efficiently than the military
does, so he can pay them more and still accomplish the job cheaper than DOD. Notice
that the major cost reduction is achieved through reduced personnel cost. This is
true of most outsourcing cases, even in the lease/charter cases, such as commercial
transport aircraft. The contractor now owns the aircraft. He is not using low grade parts
or cheaper fuel. The contractor is able to provide the service cheaper only by making
more efficient use of his personnel.
3. Labor Rates Drive Service Contract Costs
The three contracts presented in this thesis are all part of the same industry
segment. Labor rate inflation is a function ofthe industry segment or Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) in which the laborers work. The Department ofLabor maintains
hundreds of different wage determinations segregated by SIC and geographical region.
The rates of increase for the different SICs and regions are not all equal. Figure 3-9 was
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created using DOL survey data, published by the Bureau ofLabor Statistics. [Ref 24]
Average Annual Employment Cost Inflation Rates
Starting year MPN DOD Aircraft Private Professional Transportation Handlers
to 1996 Civilian Manufacturing Sector Technical Material Equipment
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Figure 3-9
Notice that the Aircraft Industry and the Professional, Technical and Specialty
sectors have a significantly higher rate of increase than the Military Personnel and DOD
Civilian do. Conversely the Transportation, Material Moving and Equipment Cleaning
sectors have somewhat lower rates of increase. The private sector as a whole is increasing
just slightly faster than DOD. However, the data only goes back to 1980, so the indication
is not as clear as it appears. Ifwe compare three average annual rate increases from 1980
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through 1996 we see that MPN = 4.56%, DOD Civilian = 3.65% and Private Sector
Composite = 4.54%. Military Personnel and Private Sector employment costs increase at
nearly the same rate.
The Service Contract Act of 1 965 requires contractors to pay their employees at
least the prevailing industry wage for the geographic region in which they are operating,
so the service contract labor rates must increase as fast as the prevailing industry wage
increases. In industries where the prevailing wage is increasing faster than the DOD
wages, the contractor has three choices: 1) Raise the price. 2) Cut his profit margin. 3)
Decrease the number ofemployees to save money.
The three contracts studied demonstrated that the contractor will chose to raise
prices, especially when all ofthe competition must pay their employees the same rate. The
simulator maintenance contract cost increases were all labor rate increases, as delineated
by DOL wage determinations. The contract managers for the aircraft maintenance
contracts both indicated that the cost increases in their respective contracts were the result
of labor rate increases. The graph in Figure 3-10 shows the employment cost indices of
the four aircraft SICs compared to the DOD aircraft maintenance composite employment
cost index. All were started in 1975 at 100%. Looking at the trend for employment costs
in the aircraft industry, it is logical that contract costs have risen fester than in-house cost.
However, one must realize that the SICs used for this graph are not the exact same ones
used for the contracts in this study. When asked to provide historical wage determination
data for this study, officials at DOL declined. The data used are from the quarterly
Employment Cost Index published by the Bureau ofLabor Statistics. [Ref 25]
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Differential inflation between in-house and contract cost is important to consider
when deciding whether or not to outsource a function currently being performed in-house,
but not when deciding about functions not currently performed in-house. For new
functions that require a substantial initial investment to perform in-house, the Government
would be best served by delaying the investment until in-house performance becomes
more economical. For in-house functions, switching to contract performance often




The contract data presented illustrated cases in which the contract cost increased
significantly faster than comparable in-house costs. This fact alone is not an adequate
rationale not to outsource
. Recall the TH-57 maintenance contract data, which had the
greatest contract cost escalation rate with the largest differential when compared to the in-
house cost escalation rate. The graph in Figure 3-1 1 shows the same two lines as in
Figure 3-4, but this time the initial saving is much larger. Notice that the lines do not






















In this example the initial saving is nearly 45% ofthe in-house cost. Although
these graphs present a clear picture of what would happen, the picture is not entirely
accurate. Once the Government decides to outsource an in-house function, it does not
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save money immediately. In fact the Government often loses money the first two or three
years. The Government doesn't just fire people because a decision was made to
outsource. People are offered early retirement, severance pay, transfers to another duty
station; and the personnel who find themselves out of a job are eligible to collect
unemployment compensation and continuing medical benefits. Reducing payrolls and
eliminating infrastructure do lead to cost savings but it is clearly a long term proposition.
In cases where the contract cost does not escalate faster than the in-house cost, the
decision to outsource or not is relatively straight forward. In cases like the ones in this
study the decision is not as clear. Ifthe Government is to achieve cost savings through
outsourcing, the contract cost must remain below the in-house cost long enough to
overcome any losses during the first few years. The table in Figure 3-12 was developed to
help decision makers determine the initial savings required so that the total contract cost
for all years equals the total in-house cost for all years over the expected project life. The
costs starting with contract initiation through the end of the second year were not included
in the calculations. Because ofthe time required for infrastructure and personnel
reductions, and ease of calculation, the models assumes zero net cost reduction for the
first two years. Although the net cost reduction throughout the project life will be zero,
money is saved at the beginning ofthe project; and it is not paid back by the Government
until some time in the future. The Government derives savings by not having to pay
interest on the money. The model assumes a Government inflation rate of3% in
accordance with OMB Circular A-76 Transmittal Memorandum No. 17. [Ref 26]
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Required Initial Savings (percent) to Break Even Over the Project Life
Expected
Life Expected Contract Cost Escalation Rate




6% rate 6.5% rate
Required Initial Savings (percent)
10 3.18 6.25 9.22 12.10 14.88 17.57 20.17
15 4.47 8.75 12.85 16.77 20.52 24.11 27.55
20 5.81 11.31 16.51 21.44 26.09 30.49 34.65
25 7.18 13.91 20.19 26.06 31.54 36.64 41.40
30 8.60 16.54 23.86 30.61 36.82 42.52 47.75
35 10.04 19.19 27.51 35.06 41.90 48.09 53.67
Figure 3-12
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IV. IN-HOUSE COST ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the total in-house cost to perform the Helicopter Combat
Support mission aboard MSC ships. The annual unit cost and annual total cost have been
calculated and are presented here. All calculations and costs are in FY 1 997 dollars. The
in-house cost can be converted to the appropriate fiscal year using DOD indices. Detailed
calculations are presented in Appendix B. This chapter is divided into four remaining
sections.
The Performance Work Statement section explains the requirements on which the
cost analysis is based. Both the in-house and contract bids must be based on the same
mission requirement.
The Most Efficient Organization section describes the Government's most efficient
means ofmeeting the requirements presented in the performance work statement.
The Procurement section explains the analysis conducted to determine the
procurement cost for the CH-60 and presents the expected procurement cost for the CH-
60.
The In-House Cost Calculation section presents the calculations required to
determine the total in-house cost. The in-house cost calculation was conducted in three
parts. They are capital expenses, personnel expenses, and operating expenses.
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B. PERFORMANCE WORK STATEMENT
This Performance Work Statement is based on fulfilling the HC requirements of
the Military Sealift Command Combat Logistic Force as determined by the CNA study,
"Analysis ofHC Requirements for the Combat Logistic Force".[Ref 27] The current size
and end strength ofthe HC community are based on the requirements necessary to
support two Major Regional Conflicts, as directed by the Bottom Up Review and the
Quadrennial Defense Review [Ref 28]. Among other requirements, the HC community
must be able to support 14 detachments aboard Military Sealift Command CLF ships
simultaneously. Each ofthese detachments currently requires two aircraft. The CNA
study reduces this requirement to one aircraft per detachment on board the TAFSs, if the
aircraft can lift 3.5 tons. Navy leaders are considering this recommendation. If accepted,
this recommendation will result in a reduction of eight operational aircraft. Therefore, in
this chapter the in-house cost is calculated for both scenarios. Remember that this
requirement reduction is based on helicopters with a 3.5 ton lift capacity, so the
replacements must also have this capacity. [Ref 29]
The total in-house cost is calculated for two separate requirements. The first
requirement of28 operational helicopters and four FRS helicopters will be referred to as
option one. Option one supports 14 two-aircraft detachments. The second requirement
of 20 operational helicopters and three FRS helicopters will be referred to as option two.
Option two supports six two-aircraft detachments and eight one-aircraft detachments.
The peacetime HC requirement for MSC CLF ships is significantly less than the 28
or 20 required in times of conflict. The Center for Naval Analyses places the peacetime
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requirements at 16 or 12 respectively [Ref 30]. The Navy must consider the contract cost
to meet both the wartime requirements and peacetime requirements. However, the in-
house operational requirements generate the FRS requirements. Therefore, the
contractors will not be tasked with any FRS requirements. More information is presented
in the following chapter on commercial alternatives.
C. MOST EFFICIENT ORGANIZATION
This analysis focusses on CH-60 operating costs instead of the CH-46D. This is
done for the following reasons: 1) The CH-60 is replacing the CH-46. It is inappropriate
to make a decision about long term savings to the Government based on an aircraft that
will not be here in the long term. Replacement of all CH-46's will be completed by FY
2003 [Ref 31], 2) After including the Government's cost of capital and depreciation, the
CH-60 is significantly more expensive to operate than the CH-46. Basing the analysis on
the higher and long term annual operating cost prevents the Government from overlooking
a potential opportunity to save money through outsourcing. 3) The CH-60 is being
procured for the HC community. Even with plans to outsource, the Navy will require 1 94
CH-60s. The Navy is planning on significant infrastructure reductions gained by reducing
helicopter types, models, and series from eight down to two variations of the H-60. From
a Navy-wide perspective the CH-60 is the most efficient choice of helicopter for in-house
support ofthe MSC CLF ships.
The HH-60 only requires 1 1 maintenance man hours (mmh) per flight hour as
compared to the CH-46, which requires 23 mmh per flight hour. Because of this reduced
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work load, the Helicopter Combat Support Community Leaders are planning significant
personnel reductions as CH-60s replace CH-46s. The detachment manning numbers used
in this cost analysis were provided by Commander Helicopter Tactical Wing Pacific, [Ref
32]. These numbers are based on the detachment size of the HSL community minus the
Anti-Submarime Warfare Aircrewmen (AW). The AWs operate the ASW equipment on
board the SH-60s, but they do not maintain the aircraft. The aircrewmen in the HC
community are also maintenance technicians, so some consolidation should be expected.
The table in Figure 4-1 shows the detachment manning used for this in-house cost
analysis. Both single aircraft and two-aircraft detachments are included. The two-aircraft
detachment size is the same for both option one and option two.
MEO Perspective Detachment Manning
Officers Enlisted Personnel
One-aircraft Detachment 4 10
Two-aircraft Detachment 6 15
Figure 4-1
The reduction in the number of different types of aircraft will result in fewer
personnel and a smaller infrastructure required for the Navy to provide intermediate and
depot level maintenance support. These reductions will ultimately lead to reduced costs
for these functions. However, calculating the new cost ofthese functions is beyond the
scope of this thesis. Consequently costs will be based on the current intermediate and
depot level manning and infrastructure.
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D. PROCUREMENT
Procurement cost for the CH-60 is the single largest cost issue for this analysis.
Procurement cost is needed to determine depreciation, cost of capital and insurance cost.
Although the Federal Government is self insured, most contractors are not; so insurance
costs must be included to ensure fair competition. Cost of capital savings are not directly
reflected in DOD's budget, but the government does pay to borrow money and can avoid
this interest by not procuring the CH-60's in question.
Before discussing the procurement cost of the CH-60, it is important review the
current plan. Currently DON requires 194 CH-60's. IfDON does not outsource the MSC
mission, then the requirement is 226 or 217 CH-60s, depending on the requirement for
two or one-aircraft per TAPS detachment. The procurement cost of the final 32 and the
final 23 CH-60s must be estimated using the learning curve calculation.
1. Learning Curve Theory
The now familiar term "learning curve" was first formalized by
T.P.Wright [1936]. After observing aircraft production for some time, he
found a constant decrease in the cumulative average production time as the
cumulative number of aircraft produced doubles. By studying previous
production records he was able to determine the rate of decrease in
production times for similar kinds of aircraft. Determining the rate of
decrease in production time made it possible for him to predict production
times and delivery schedules for future aircraft with a high degree of
accuracy. Since becoming formalized, the model has been used in a wide
variety of industries. In the production process, when the variable
production costs are observed to be declining in a systematic manner as the
number of units produced increases, the process is said to be following the
learning curve phenomenon.
The basic theory of the learning curve is simple: a worker learns as he
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or she works; and the more often he repeats an operation, the more
efficient he becomes, with the result that the direct labor input per unit
declines. The factors that account for this increasing efficiency as
cumulative output increases are numerous and cannot be completely




job familiarization by workers as a result of repetition,
2. general improvement in shop organization and coordination,
3. development ofmore efficient parts-supply systems,
4. improvement in overall management.
Although there are several different terms, such as experience curve,
cost improvement curve, cost reduction curve, price reduction curve,
performance improvement curve, etc., and some ofthese terms are not
true synonyms, the theory behind them is the same. That is, whenever the
cumulative quantity of units produced doubles, the unit production cost or
labor-hours declines by a constant percent.
Having discussed the basic premises underlying the learning curve, let
us now proceed to an examination of specifics about what the curve is. In
T. P. Wright's original formulation, he suggested that as the cumulative
number of aircraft produced doubles, the cumulative average cost to
produce them goes down at a constant rate. This theory is known as the
cumulative average theory (a.k.a. Wright's Model) and was used widely
in the aircraft industry for many years.
The standard learning curve formula used by Wright to formulate the
decrease of cost at a constant rate, r, when the quantity is doubled:
V-flCC*
where:
a = the theoretical first unit cost, and
b = the learning curve exponent, measured as follows:
b = log(r)/log(2)
y = cumulative average costs (or hours) of each ofthe x
cumulative units produced, and
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x = the cumulative number of units produced. [Ref 33]
2. Assumptions and Basis for Analysis
The CH-60 negotiations will not be final until sometime after December 1 997, so it
is necessary to use historical procurement information to determine the learning rate. The
CH-60 is a modification of the Army's UH-60L, so procurement data from the UH-60 will
be analyzed. The graph in Figure 4-2 shows the UH-60 cumulative average cost versus
total number procured, starting with the initial procurement in 1977. [Ref 34]
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Figure 4-2
The graph shows a nearly perfect learning curve. The data can be used to determine the
UH-60 learning rate and theoretical first unit cost by completing a linear regression of the
log(y) against the log(x) . The results of the log log linear regression analysis presented in
Figure 4-3 confirm the strength of the relationship. Note the adjusted R-squared value of
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87.9%. This means that 87.9 percent of the variability in cumulative average cost (y) is
explained by the number of units produced (x). Furthermore, both of the T-statistic values
show a significance above the 99.9% probability.
Linear Regression Results
Predictor Coef StDev T P
Constant 10.2613 0.1014 101.22 0.000
Slope (b) -0.18995 0.01574 -12.07 0.000
S = 0.08063 R-Sq = 88.5% R-Sq(adj) = 87.9%
Figure 4-3
The CH-60 is not an entirely new aircraft design. The basic airframe is an Army
UH-60. However, many of the dynamic components are from the Navy's SH-60 or
altogether new. The cargo handling system and the all electronic (glass) cockpit are new.
Because of this unique composition ofthe CH-60, a unique learning curve is required. It
would be inaccurate to start the UH-60 learning from the beginning, after 1457 UH-60s
have been produced. However, the CH-60 initial units are more than twice the cost ofa
UH-60 and there are many new components making the CH-60 a new aircraft. To
account for this unique problem the following assumptions were made: 1) The UH-60
learning curve will be used for the basic airframe cost, continuing from unit number 1457.
2) The cost of the modification, defined as the difference between the cost of the CH-60
less the cost of the UH-60, will start over on the learning curve using the same learning
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rate as the UH-60. 3) The cost provided by the program office for the first 78 CH-60s is
correct and was used to determine the cumulative average cost of the first 78
modifications [Ref 35].
3. Procurement Cost
Using these three assumptions the average unit cost of any number of CH-60s can
be determined by summing the two separate learning curve calculations. Using the results
presented in Figure 4-3 and the average cost of the first 78 CH-60s, the two learning
curve equations are:
(1) yl = (28603.947)(x+1457)-° 18995 UH-60 cost
(2) y2 = (17215.59)x "° 18995 Modification cost
where: yl+y2 = cumulative average unit cost of x units (in thousands of 1997 dollars).
The total cost can be calculated by multiplying the average unit cost (yl+y2) by
the number of units (x). The total costs of 194, 217, and 226 CH-60s were determined
and then the differences were taken to get the cost of the additional aircraft in accordance
with the two possible requirements. The results are in Figure 4-4.
Cost of CH-60s in thousands of 1 997 dollars
Number of CH-60s 194 217 226
Total Cost of CH-60s $2,341,115.74 $2,588,049.84 $2,683,933.38
Cost of CH-60s above 194 N/A $ 246,934.09 $ 342,817.63
Figure 4-4
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E. IN-HOUSE COST CALCULATION
The costs presented here are divided into three categories. 1 . Capital costs include
all ofthe costs incurred as a result of owning the aircraft-depreciation, insurance and cost
of capital. 2. Operating expenses include the costs associated with operating the aircraft,
except the organizational military personnel expenses. 3. Personnel expenses include all
ofthe organizational military personnel costs, wages and fringe benefits.
1. Capital Expenses
a. Annual Depreciation
OMB Circular A-76 requires the use of straight line depreciation to
determine annual depreciation expenses. Annual depreciation equals the asset acquisition
cost less the residual value divided by the expected service life ofthe asset. The expected
residual value is 2.48% ofthe acquisition cost, in accordance with A-76.[Ref 36]
The expected service life for the CH-60 was estimated by using the average
age ofthe active helicopters in the HC community. Since all the helicopters used in the
average are still active and not due to be replaced for 2 - 6 years, the average age is going
to get even higher. However, the current age is acceptable for this analysis. The
Commanders of Helicopter Tactical Wings Atlantic and Pacific had their staffs compile the
data, and they determined the average age of the aircraft to be 32.7 years [Ref 37]. This
calculation took place some months ago. Thirty three years will be used for the service
life expectancy of the CH-60. However, the current inventory will average 35 years or
more before it is retired.
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b. Insurance Cost
According to OMB A-76, the Government must factor in insurance costs
even though it is self insured [Ref 38]. The information required to calculate these
insurance costs is available through the General Services Administration [Ref 39]. Both
liability and collision insurance must be included in the calculations. For the H-60, the
annual cost of collision insurance is 1 .75% of the acquisition cost and the annual liability
insurance is $ 6,000.00 plus $250.00 per seat in the aircraft.
c. Cost of Capital
The cost of capital accounts for the Government's interest on the debt
which could be avoided if the asset in question was not purchased. The Government's
cost of capital is equal to the interest rate paid on the thirty year Treasury bond for any
asset with a service life of thirty years or longer. In this case the cost of capital was
calculated at 6%. [Ref 40]
d. Total Annual Capital Expenses
Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6 provide the capital expenses for the procurement
of both 32 CH-60s and 23 CH-60s. Each annual expense is presented in total and per
aircraft. All expenses are in 1997 dollars.
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Total Per Aircraft






























Total of annual capital costs $ 37,027,148 $ 1,157,098
Figure 4-5
Capital Costs for Option One, 32 CH-60s
Total Per Aircraft




























Total of annual capital costs $ 26,670,419 $ 1,159,583
Figure 4-6
Capital Costs for Option Two, 23 CH-60s
2. Personnel Expenses
Military personnel expenses must be calculated using the Military Standard
Composite Rates. The composite rates include basic pay, retired pay accrual, basic
allowance for quarters, incentive pay, permanent change of station and miscellaneous
56
expense. A copy ofthe FY 1997 rates and breakdown is provided in Appendix B.[Ref 41 ]
The exact distribution ofpay grades ofthe members of each detachment vary
depending on availability. To deal with this variability, the Navy-wide weighted average is
not used here. Rather a squadron-level HC community weighted average, which is more
representative ofthe actual combination ofpay grades available, is used. One weighted
average was calculated for officers and another for enlisted personnel. The officer
weighted average was slightly lower for the squadron as compared to the Navy-wide
average, while the enlisted average was much higher for the squadron. This caused the
total personnel costs to be higher when using the squadron-level weighted average.
The personnel costs would not be complete ifthe cost of flight training were
omitted from the calculations. The flight training cost was provided by the Bureau of
Naval Personnel via COMHELTACWINGPAC. The cost was amortized over the
average career length for an aviator in the HC community. The total squadron level
personnel costs are provided in Figure 4-7. The intermediate and depot level personnel
costs are included in the operating expenses. [Ref42]
Total Per aircraft
Option One Personnel Costs
For 14 two aircraft detachments. $16,405,475 $ 585,910
Option Two Personnel Costs
For 8 one aircraft detachments $ 6,249,705
For 6 two aircraft detachments $ 7,030,918




Total Annual Squadron Personnel Costs
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3. Operating Costs
Operating costs for multi-engine state-of-the-art military helicopters are difficult to
calculate. The Navy Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA) maintains the Navy's Visibility
And Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) program. The VAMOSC
data base is the most complete data base available for the purpose of determining Navy
operating costs.
Aircraft data is available by type, model and series from NCCA. The data base has
data starting from 1987. The Navy did not start operating HH-60's until 1989. TheHH-
60 is the most comparable helicopter to CH-60 that the Navy has, so it will be used to
predict the CH-60 operating costs. The VAMOSC data for the HH-60 is provided in
Appendix B. The data has been escalated to FY 1997 dollars by NCCA.
The NCCA is tasked with capturing all of the operating costs in the VAMOSC
data base. The data base contains over 60 fields per aircraft per year. The costs are
organized and grouped logically. However, fixed costs are not separated from variable
costs. Therefore, the in-house cost calculated here will overstate the savings gained by
discontinuing in-house operations.[Ref43]
Operating cost per flight hour and annual flight hours per aircraft are all that are
required to determine expected annual operating cost per aircraft. Linear regression of
total cost versus flight hours was the first method attempted in an effort to identify fixed
costs. The regression results proved unreliable, yielding a large negative fixed cost
component. Since the regression was unreliable, an average cost per flight hour was
calculated by first summing all the costs for all years and then dividing by the total flight
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hours for all years. Additionally, this procedure was repeated after excluding the squadron
military personnel costs, which were calculated separately, based on the Government
MEO. The average annual flight hours per aircraft (utilization rate) was calculated based
on the data for the CH-46D, since the hours required to perform the HC mission are
relevant to the case.
The operating costs captured in the VAMOSC data base do contain personnel
costs for the squadron, intermediate, and depot maintenance levels. These personnel costs
are calculated using the Standard Military Composite rates and the appropriate civilian
rates for the DOD civilians [Ref 44]. The operating costs for the operational aircraft
include all personnel costs except the squadron military personnel. The Fleet Replacement
Squadron (FRS) aircraft operating costs do include the squadron military personnel costs.
The total operating costs are presented in Figure 4-8.
Annual Operating Costs Option One 32 CH-60s
total Per aircraft
Annual Operating cost Operational $21,019,462 $ 750,695
Annual Operating cost FRS $ 6,085,654 $1,521,413
Total Annual Operating Costs $27,105,116
Annual Operating Costs Option Two 23 CH-60s
Total Per aircraft
Annual Operating costs operational $15,013,901 $ 750,695
Annual Operating costs FRS $ 4,564,240 $ 1 ,521 ,41
3




4. Total In-House Costs
a. Option One
The table in Figure 4-9 presents the total and unit in-house costs for option
one. Option one in-house performance requires 28 operational helicopters and 4 FRS
helicopters. The unit in-house cost is based on 28 commercial helicopters to replace 32
CH-60s and meet the operational wartime requirements.
Total Per Aircraft
Total of annual capital costs $37,027,147 $ 1,157,098
Organizational Personnel costs
For 14 two aircraft detachments $16,405,475 $ 585,910
Annual Operating cost
For 14 two aircraft detachments $ 21 ,019,462 $ 750,695
Four FRS Aircraft $ 6,085,654 $ 1,521,413
Operational aircraft
CH-60 total annual cost $69,823,691 $ 2,493,703
FRS aircraft
CH-60 total annual cost $10,714,047 $ 2,678,512
Total In-House cost of the HC MSC mission $ 80,537,738 $ 2,876,348
Figure 4-9
In-House Cost for Option One
b. Option Two
The table in Figure 4-10 presents the total and unit in-house costs for
option two. Option two in-house performance requires 20 operational helicopters and 3
FRS helicopters. The unit in-house cost is based on 20 commercial helicopters to replace
23 CH-60s and meet the operational wartime requirements.
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Total Per Aircraft
Total of annual capital costs $ 26,670,419 $ 1 ,159,583
Organizational Personnel costs
For 6 two aircraft and 8 one aircraft Detachments $ 13,280,623
Annual operating costs
For 6 two aircraft and 8 one aircraft Detachments $ 15,013,901 $ 750,695
For 3 FRS aircraft $ 4,564,240 $ 1 ,521 ,413
Operational aircraft
CH-60 total annual cost $ 51 ,486, 1 93 $ 2,574,31
FRS aircraft
CH-60 total annual cost/aircraft $ 8,042,990 $ 2,680,997
Total In-House cost of the HC MSC mission $ 59,529,183 $ 2,976,459
Figure 4-10





The purpose of this chapter is to examine the feasibility of outsourcing the HC
mission on board the Military Sealift Command (MSC) Combat Logistics Force (CLF)
ships and to establish criteria to evaluate the possible commercial alternatives.
Three Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) have been
completed in an attempt to determine the feasibility and limitations of commercial
helicopter alternatives. These ACTDs have generated many reports and discussions about
the feasibility and minimum requirements ofcommercial alternatives. After-action reports
from the first two demonstrations have been made available, including a Center for Naval
Analyses study. To date, no after-action reports from the third study have been provided.
Limited information about the third demonstration has been obtained through
conversations with persons working for N88 and COMHELTACWINGPAC.
The first two demonstrations were both conducted using the Kaman Corporation
as the prime contractor, flying the K-max helicopter. The third demonstration contract
was awarded to Evergreen Corporation, flying the UH-1 . The first demonstration was
approximately two months long; the second lasted for a full six month deployment. The
third demonstration was scheduled to complete a six month deployment as well, but it
ended early. The official reason for the early end has not yet been made available. The
primary purpose of the demonstrations was to study the concept of commercial helicopter
logistics at sea; evaluating the specific aircraft and contractors was a secondary objective.
This chapter is presented in two sections, a discussion of the feasibility followed by
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the evaluation criteria for the commercial alternatives.
B. FEASIBILITY
The after-action reports from the different sources present opposing opinions on
suitability ofK-max to perform the required mission. However, all ofthe reports agree
that the concept ofcommercial VERTREP is plausible. The K-max helicopter has specific
limitations which do not apply to all commercial helicopters, but these limitations required
the elimination of 13 out of 35 scheduled test events for the first ACTD. The K-max is
not certified for night operations or Instrument Flight Rules. Furthermore, it cannot carry
passengers and has an extremely small internal cargo capacity of .9 cubic yards. These
limitations led to K-max being excluded from bidding for the third demonstration.
The third demonstration was required to evaluate the Critical Operational Issues
(COI) for which K-max was not capable of performing. As previously stated, the after-
action reports are not yet available from the third demonstration. Although some of the
verbal information received concerning the third demonstration was less than favorable,
the criticism was directed at the contractor, not the concept. From all ofthe information
received to date concerning the third demonstration, the concept ofcommercial
VERTREP is valid.
The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet after-action report reached the
following conclusions:
a. The Commercial VERTREP Helicopter concept is operationally
suitable.
b. The Commercial VERTREP Helicopter concept is operationally
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effective.
However, the following recommendation was also included in the report:
c. Do not contract to deploy any additional detachments in
support ofthe Commercial VERTREP Helo Program until completion of
the LANTFLT operational evaluation in USNS SATURN. The LANTFLT
operational evaluation will provide resolution of COI's that will document
the capability requirements for helicopters embarked in T-AFS's operating
in a different AORfarea of responsibility]. [Ref 45]
The after-action and CNA reports for the first demonstration state similar conclusions.
Therefore, in the absence of any information to the contrary, it is concluded that using a
commercial alternative to provide Helicopter Combat Support from MSC CLF ships is
operationally feasible.
C. COMMERCIAL ALTERNATIVE EVALUATION
Different commercial alternatives (different helicopter models) will have different
capabilities and limitations. Comparing commercial alternatives to each other and to the
in-house alternative will require economic adjustments for the differing capabilities.
Quantifying these differences may be subjective in some cases. However, it is still
necessary ifan equitable comparison is to be made.
One may be inclined to think that a well defined Mission Needs Statement (MNS)
could reduce the variation of capabilities between qualified bidders and the in-house bid.
The Navy does have a well defined MNS. However, alternatives which fail to comply
with the MNS are still being considered as possible alternatives by high level decision
makers. Consider the following two statements, one from the Deputy ChiefofNaval
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Operations Logistics and the other from CINCPACFLT.
I realize Kmax, or a comparable alternative, will not perform all current HC
missions, but the cost savings would seem to be significant enough to
justify finding alternate solutions for those other missions. [Ref 46]
Navy must make a decision on the USN requirement for night VERTREP
operations. Decision should be made with knowledge of resource
costs/savings associated with options. Once this decision made, the K-Max
aircraft may be a candidate for further Commercial Helicopter
contracts. [Ref47]
These statements demonstrate that the mission needs statement may be redefined ifthe
potential cost savings are significant enough. To consider every possible alternative in
advance is not possible, so the goal for the reminder of this chapter is to establish some
general guide lines and considerations for some of the different alternatives already being
considered.
1. Surge Capacity
The current National Strategy requires that the HC Community support six TAEs
and eight TAFSs. This requires 28 operational helicopters and four FRS helicopters.
However, more often than not these helicopters will only be used to support eight CLF
ships. This excess capacity allows the Navy to meet personnel tempo requirements. The
excess capacity also gives the appearance of inefficiency and an opportunity to save
money. Proponents of this issue have proposed savings through the replacement of28
operational and four FRS helicopters with 16 contract helicopters, foiling to include the
cost of a surge capacity. The job of the Navy is to be ready for war and any cost
comparison must include the cost of a surge capacity. Consider these options to account
for surge capacity. 1) Use a separate contract for the remaining 12 helicopters, with all
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the required personnel in a standby status to be called when needed. The contractor
would be responsible to ensure the aircraft and personnel were prepared for the mission.
Once called, the contractor would be paid a use rate above and beyond the standby rates.
To calculate the true cost of this option the expected probability of use for the standby
helicopters must be accurately estimated. The cost to the Government and the revenue for
the contractor will change as a function ofworld contingencies. 2) Pay the prime
contractor for 28 helicopters even though the plan is to use only those helicopters
necessary to support eight MSC ships. Ifworld contingencies require the mobilization of
additional MSC ships, then the contractor must provide additional helicopters, up to the
28 helicopter total. In this case the cost to the Government and the revenue to the
contractor are not functions ofworld contingencies. If the contractors know they can
perform the mission using 16 helicopters and will only be required to provide additional
helicopters as needed, they will estimate the expected probability of use for the standby
helicopters and bid accordingly. In both cases, permitting the contractors to use the
helicopters to provide commercial services while in standby status for the Navy should
reduce the cost ofthe contract, since the contractor is not forgoing the opportunity of
providing commercial services. Whichever option is chosen, the cost of the surge capacity
must be included in the total contract cost before comparing the contract cost to the total
in-house cost.
2. Cost Adjustments for Reduced Capabilities
Proponents ofthe K-max helicopter as the alternative to the in-house performance
are comparing the contract and in-house costs directly. They are failing to account for the
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different capabilities ofthe two different helicopters. The in-house operational costs are
based on the average utilization rates for the HC aircraft; these utilization rates include
flight time performing missions that K-max is not capable of performing. The supporters
claim that enough excess capacity is available in the remainder of the fleet helicopters to
provide for the lost capabilities. The CNA study ofHC requirements contradicts this
claim; however, for argument purposes, assume the excess capacity does exist. Using
other Navy helicopters to perform missions K-max is not capable of costs the Navy
money. Since excess capacity is assumed, then the additional cost to the Navy is the
marginal operating cost for the other helicopters to perform the HC missions. The HH-60
has the lowest marginal operating cost ofthe fleet helicopters. It costs $1707 per hour.
This operating cost was obtained by subtracting squadron personnel cost from total cost
and dividing by total tlight time (all the data comes from the VAMOSC data base). The
annual utilization rate for an operational HC helicopter is 440 hours per year. This was
calculated by dividing total annual flight hours by the number of aircraft. Ofthe 440
hours, approximately 31 percent are training hours. This leaves 304 mission hours. This
was calculated from Training Mission Requirement codes (TMR). These codes
distinguish between training flights and many other mission types. The training hours
were divided by the total flight hours for the operational squadrons. Ofthose mission
hours CNA states that 3 1 percent are for internal cargo and passengers and the remaining
69 percent are for external cargo operations. Additionally, 25 percent ofthe external
hours are flown at night. The night percentage was determined by totaling HC-5s MSC
detachment flight hours (day, night and total) from 1990 through the summer of 1997.
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The night hours were divided by the total hours. The total mission hours that must be
flown by in-house aircraft to compensate for the Kmax is 147 hours per aircraft per year.
These 147 hours will cost the Navy an additional $250,929 per aircraft per year. This cost
represents the marginal cost, assuming excess capacity exists; the cost will increase
significantly if excess capacity does not exist. These additional costs are incurred because
the K-max is unable to perform certain missions; therefore, it is inappropriate to disregard
these costs when comparing K-max to aircraft that are capable ofperforming all missions.
All commercial alternatives are not equal, so the only equitable way to compare
them to each other and the CH-60 is to adjust each bid based on the flight time
requirements ofthe missions for which the aircraft is not capable. These cost adjustments
cannot account for the intrinsic value ofhaving a more capable aircraft at the disposal of
the Fleet Commanders.
3. One Aircraft TAFS Detachments
The Navy is considering placing only one aircraft on TAFSs based on a
recommendation by CNA. However, this reduction in aircraft is recommended only for
aircraft with a 3.5 ton lift capacity. Ifthe Navy accepts this recommendation, then only
one CH-60 per TAFS will be required for in-house performance. Ifthe proposed contract
aircraft cannot lift 3.5 tons, then two contract aircraft must be used to replace one CH-60.




VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The analysis in Chapter III demonstrated that service contract costs often escalate
at substantially different rates than in-house costs. All three of the contracts studied in
Chapter III escalated substantially faster than the comparable in-house costs. This
escalation rate differential reduces long term savings and can ultimately lead to increased
costs to the Government. Chapter III also demonstrated that employment costs in some
Standard Industrial Classifications escalate much quicker than in-house employment costs,
while some SICs escalate much slower. Finally Chapter III presents a model to deal with
differential escalation rates by ensuring the initial savings is great enough to compensate
for the differential.
Chapter IV presents the total in-house cost for two different options to support the
HC MSC mission. Option one has a total cost of $80,537,738 for 28 operational aircraft.
Option two has a total cost of $59,529,183 for 20 operational aircraft.
Chapter V presents evidence showing that commercial alternatives are capable of
fulfilling the HC mission in question. However, the chapter also demonstrated that less
capable alternatives can dramatically increase the true contract cost to the Government.
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Government and specifically DOD should focus their outsourcing efforts on
functions in which the expected contract escalation rate is at or below the expected in-
house escalation rate. This can be accomplished by looking at SICs which have
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historically low employment cost increase rates, like "Handlers, Equipment Cleaners, and
Laborers" and Transportation, Material Moving presented in Chapter III. Furthermore, if
outsourcing a function in which the expected contract cost escalation is higher than the
expected in-house cost escalation rate, the data in Figure 3-12 can be used to determine
the required amount of initial cost savings to avoid a long term loss to the Government.
Applying this logic to the HC outsourcing issue, one would first estimate the
expected escalation rate by using historical data. From the data in Chapter III, the lowest
annual contract cost escalation rate is 4.52 percent for the C-12 contract. Using this rate
and a 35 year expected project life, the initial contract savings should equal 27.51 percent
ofthe Navy's in-house cost. This equates to a bid of $58,381 ,806 for option one or
$43,152,705 for option two. Labor rate data for the appropriate SIC's should be available
from the Department ofLabor and should be used to estimate the contract cost escalation
rate. The Department ofLabor would not provide this data for this thesis.
IfDON does not outsource this mission, it should test option two to ensure it
provides adequate service to the fleet. Option two costs 26 percent less than option one.
This equates to an annual savings of $21,008,555. DON cannot afford to overlook an
opportunity of this magnitude.
Form DD350 should be modified to include contract volume and unit price
information as well as the previous and follow-on contract numbers. This modification
would enhance the value of the DOD contract data maintained at the Federal Data Center,
making it easier to determine contract cost escalation rates.
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APPENDIX A. COST INDICES
This appendix contains the data and calculations referred to in Chapter Three of
this thesis. Calculations and data contained in Chapter III are not repeated here. The data
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APPENDIX B. IN-HOUSE COST
This appendix contains the data and calculations summarized in Chapter IV.
Chapter IV presented the results and analysis of the in-house cost calculations. The actual
calculations and the data used for those calculations are presented here. The procurement
cost data and calculations are presented first, followed by the weighted average personnel
cost calculation and the military composite standard pay data. Finally, the total in-house
cost calculations for option one and option two are presented.
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Detachment Personnel Costs for Two Aircraft Detachment
Manning weighted average cost Total Cost
Officers for each for Detachment
6 $76,853 $461,118 Weighted average is based on current HC community manning
Enlisted
15 $37,069 $556,035
total det manning cost $1,017,153 per aircraft $508,577 <«Personnel cost/aircraft =C9/2
Flight Training Cost
Amortized Flight Training Cost Per Pilot $ 25,778 «<= $340,000/1 3.5years
Per aircraft $ 77,333 <« = D11*A5/2













Procurement cost of 32 CH-60s $ 342,817,634 $ 10,713,051 <« From learning curve
Salvage Value $ 8,501,877 $ 265,684 <«2.48% of Procurement cost
Annual Depreciation cost $ 10,130,781 $ 316,587 <«(procurement-salvage)/33
Annual Cost of Capital $ 20,569,058 $ 642,783 <«6% of Procurement cost
Collision Insurance cost $ 5,999,309 $ 187,478 <«1.75% of procurement cost
Liability insurance cost $ 328,000 $ 10,250 <«$6000 + 1 7seats* $250/seat






Annual Operating cost Operational $ 21,019,462 $ 750,695 ««C56*C58

















Summation of Operating, Personnel, and Capital Costs
Total of annual capital costs $ 37,027,148 $ 1,157,098
Organizational Personnel costs
For 14 two aircraft dets. $ 16,405,475 $ 585,910
Annual Operating cost Operational $ 21,019,462 $ 750,695
Annual Operating cost FRS $ 6,085,654 $ 1,521,413
operational aircraft
CH-60 total annual cost/aircraft $ 69,823,691 <« = E42*28 $ 2,493,703 <« = E35 + E37 + E39
FRS aircraft








Replacing 28 operational aircraft and 4 FRS aircraft with 28 contract aircraft
Per Contract Aircraft
Total In-House cost of Option One %^ 80,537,738 <« = C42+C45 $2,876,348 <« = C52/28









Cost per Flight hour of HH-60 $ 3,362.98 1 997 dollars/hour
CPFH less Sqd personnel cost $ 1,707.08 1 997 dollars/hour
Operational annual utilization rate 439.753937 hours/year
FRS annual utilization rate 452.40061 16 hours/year
93
CH-60 Option Two
A B C D E F
1 Total In-House Cost of Option Two
2 Detachment Personnel Costs for One Aircraft Detachment
3 Manning weighted average cost Total Cost
4 Officers for each for Detachment












total det manning cost $678,102 per aircraft $678,102 <«Personnel cost/aircraft =C9
Ammortized Flight Training Cost Per Pilot $ 25,778 <«= $340,000/1 3.5years
Per aircraft $ 103,111 <« = a3*e3
Total Detachment Personnel Cost Per Aircraft $781 ,21 3 <« = E1 3 + E9
16
17 Capital Costs
18 Total Per Aircraft
19 Procurement cost of 23 CH-60s $ 246,934,092 $ 10,736,265 «< From learning curve
20 Salvage Value $ 6,123,965 $ 266,259 <«2.48% of Procurement cost
21 Annual Depreciation cost $ 7,297,277 $ 317,273 <«(procurement-salvage)/33
22 Annual Cost of Capital $ 14,816,046 $ 644,176 <«6% of Procurement cost
23 Collision Insurance cost $ 4,321,347 $ 187,885 <«1 .75% of procurement cost
24 Liability insurance cost $ 235,750 $ 10,250 <«$6000+ 17seats*$250/seat
25 Total of annual capital costs $ 26,670,419 $ 1,159,583
26
27 Annual Operating Costs




Annual Operating costs FRS $ 4,564,240 $ 1,521,413 <«c42*C36
32
33 Summation of Operating, Personnel, and Capital Costs
34 Total of annual capital costs $ 26,670,419 $ 1,159,583
35 Organizational Personnel costs
36 For 8 one aircraft dets $ 6,249,705 $ 781,213
37 For 6 two aircraft dets $ 7,030,918 $ 585,910 <« same as option one
38 Total Squadron Personnel costs $ 13,280,623
39 Annual Operating costs operational $ 15,013,901 $ 750,695
40 Annual Operating costs FRS $ 4,564,240 $ 1,521,413
41 operational aircraft
42 CH-60 total annual cost 5^,51,486,193 $ 2,574,310 <« = C42/20





CH-60 total annual cost/aircraft $ 8,042,990 <« = E45*3 $ 2,680,997 <« = E34 + E40
48
49 Replacing 20 operational aircraft and 3 FRS aircraft with 20 contract aircraft
50 Per Contract Aircraft
51 Total In-House cost of Option Two ^.59,529,183 <« = C42+C45 $2,976,459 <« = C52/20




Cost per Flight hour of HH-60 $ 3,362.98 1 997 dollars/hour
56
57




Opertional annual utilization rate 439.753937 hours/year




TABLE OF KEY PROCESSING CONSIDERATIONS/LIMITATIONS
1
.
Input data do not flow directly to the related output report elements without manual
or automated preprocessing and allocation is required.
2. Input data received on listings or diskettes are key entered to processing site files.
3. Automated V&V includes edit checks during the production runstream and additional
automated V&V of input data.
4. Data inputs, in most cases, are keyed either to UIC or TEC. Subordinate keys include
AG/SAG, SSN, E/E, F/SF, MC, and TMS, as appropriate.
5. Two preprocessing routines for CNO FHP and training data are accomplished to
overcome input data limitations related to weapon system (i.e. TEC) and activity
(UIC) identification.
6. Most Marine Corps aviation personnel, aircraft, and operating costs are distributed to
the Fleet Commanders because Fleet Marine Force (FMF) aviation units operate under
Fleet Commander operational authority.
7. Intermediate level costs received for Naval Air Stations, Marine Corps Air Stations,
and MALS are allocated to aircraft based on a data table cross-referencing bases (or
MALS) to squadrons supported. Organizational level costs received for Naval Air
Stations and Marine Corps Air Stations are allocated to the aircraft operated by the
station.
8. ATMSR is constructed around squadron, base, and ship input cost data. Special
functions and matrices have been developed to distribute aviation related O&S costs
received from input for Wings, CNET squadrons, MALS, Detachments,
ASOD/NSOD, and Training Wings.
9. Composite data is a collective term for source data other than CNO FHP and the CRP
file.
10. Report production is currently a one-time annual batch process. Automated history files
are used to produce special reports, as required.
11. Fleet Readiness Squadrons (FRS) are identified from a hard-coded table. FRS costs are
identified as training costs and not regular operational costs. FRS costs are reported only for
95
MC CINCLANTFLT and CINCPACFLT.
12. ATMSR is primarily oriented to squadrons and stations operating Navy and Marine Corps
aircraft. However, aircraft O&S costs are also incurred and reported at the UIC level for Wings,
Detachments, and special purpose (Blue Angels, President's helo) aircraft.
13. Because source data are received at the UIC or TEC (T/M/S) level, special UIC and TEC
summary files are established within the system to accommodate those data. Since aircraft flight
hour data from the FHP does not specify individual UlCs, the UIC summary files developed by a
preprocessing routine (CRP file) serve that purpose.
14. Aircraft O&S costs reported under MC CNET are dedicated undergraduate pilot training costs.
This includes training aircraft maintenance personnel costs.
15. Personnel costs for aviation capable ships company and aircraft carrier ship's company are
contained in Navy VAMOSC-SFflPS reports.
16. The source for AVDLR costs is the CNO FHP. If aircraft maintenance for a TMS is performed
under contract, AVDLR costs are generally subsumed in the contract amount and are not
specifically reported by the ACC to the FHP.
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